Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

Fall 2004

Brown and Shades of Gray: Ex Parte
Communication in the Litigation Over Racial
Justice
Norman I. Silber
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Norman I. Silber, Brown and Shades of Gray: Ex Parte Communication in the Litigation Over Racial Justice, 31 Litigation 6 (2004)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/626

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Brown and Shades of Gray:
Ex Parte Communication in
the Litigation over Racial Justice

by Norman I. Silber
president and the Court, swayed the deliberative process. The
timing, operative language, and logic of the opinions all
changed in response to political intrigues and partisan interests. Dred Scott diminished hope for confining the reach of
slavery through the legal process. It made the American Civil
War all but inevitable. The result, and the manner in which it
was reached, diminished the stature of the Supreme Court and
cemented a popular belief in its sectional bias and political
partisanship.
Almost 100 years later, Brown v. Board of Education
offered the Court a possible opportunity to redeem-from the
perspective of an increasingly diverse and liberal nation-its
judicial legacy. Popular interest in a case that might challenge
racial segregation in American public schools increased
throughout the late 1940s, as the NAACP transformed its
quest for racial justice into a national social movement. Furthermore, as the competition between the two global "superpowers" intensified, competition between them over ideological respect for people of different races, religious groups, and
nationalities emerged as a dimension of the Cold War.
More immediately, Brown required the justices to consider
the narrower, institution-building context of their decision.
Shortly before World War H, severe conflict over the constitutionality of New Deal legislation had left the Court's place
in the constitutional scheme highly problematic. President
Franklin Roosevelt had proposed to pack the Court with New
Deal sympathizers. All this occurred while the newer jurisprudence of "legal realism" contended that what the justices did
was based less on enduring principles and more on the political and social context in which problems arrived at the Court.
These developments suggested that the Court might just be
making up the law to suit powerful interests, and its reputation
and authority suffered as a result.
By the early 1940s, Roosevelt appointees dominated the
Court, and the ideological tug-of-war over activism took a different form. Justices Douglas and Black, particularly, minimized the need for restraint in discovering core constitutional

As the justices contemplated their case, a complicated picture
emerged. Their opinion would dramatically affect the rights
of African Americans in predominantly white America. Massive resistance and violence would be the likely result of any
holding that upset the status quo. And yet, by acting courageously, the Supreme Court could align the Constitution with
human dignity and equality. A clear and bold decision might
just avert looming civil unrest.
To buy time for a consensus, the justices delayed. Several
received advice from outside the Court and corresponded
secretly with political leaders from the other branches of government. Some leaked information about their views to the
press. The president contacted members of the Court privately. Congressmen lobbied the Court as well.
Rumors spread that the president and the chief justice were
conspiring over the case.
No, the story above is not about Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the most remarkable civil rights
case of the 20th century. It is about Dred Scott v. Sandford,60
U.S. 393 (1857)-the most controversial civil rights litigation
of the 19th century. By the time Dred Scott was finally
decided, the multiplicity of opinions produced substantial
confusion about what it actually held. Justice Taney wrote an
"opinion of the Court." Justice Curtis wrote a dissent. Several
others wrote partial concurrences. In the end, however, this
much seemed certain: As a result of the opinion, Negroes
could not be citizens of the United States; Congress had no
power to exclude slavery from the federal territories; and,
accordingly, the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.
Adverse reaction throughout the North was immediate and
intense.
Historians have confirmed that significant back-door communications between Southern politicians, especially the
Norman L Silber is a professor at Hofstra University School of Law. He is
the authorof With All Deliberate Speed: The Life of Philip Elman, an oral
history (2004).
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values and in applying federal standards to the states, even as
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson continued to profess the
importance of deference to legislative will.
After FDR's death, President Truman occasionally placed
pressure on the Court to see things his way. When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died in 1946, Truman replaced him
with his friend Fred Vinson from Kentucky. According to historian Roger Newman, their special relationship included a
phone in Truman's bedroom that connected directly at Vinson's house. Hugo Black (1994). In the spring of 1952, rumors
circulated that before Truman seized steel mills to alleviate a
national strike, he had received an "advance opinion" from the
chief justice that it would be constitutional to do so. (Vinson
was proved wrong, however, and wrote a dissent to the court's
later decision overturning the seizures.) Relations between the
justices worsened further as the Court mishandled appeals
and stays in the convictions and executions of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg.

C
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It was in this context of institutional fragility, ideological
division, and political partisanship that the justices contemplated the five test cases that were grouped as Brown v.Board
of Education.At that time, restoring the Court's earlier public
image of legitimacy had become a special priority. A clear
decision in Brown, it was hoped, might rebuild the Court's
integrity, independence, nonpartisanship, and procedural rectitude.
The cases began to work their way up toward the Court in
1950. The first briefs were submitted there in December 1952
and were argued for the first time in front of the Court in early
1953. Several justices, Frankfurter and Jackson among them,
believed that the race cases presented a special set of challenges to the Court's fragile stature. They had strong views
about what they did and did not want the opinion in Brown to
look like.
Philip Elman, the assistant to the solicitor general and former clerk to Justice Frankfurter, played a central role in developing the government's position. Elman described what
Frankfurter had told him about his approach to dealing with
the constitutionality of the separate-but-equal doctrine in the
years between 1950 and 1952:
Frankfurter wanted the Court to deal with the issue
openly, directly, wisely, courageously, and more than
anything else, unanimously. He did not want the segregation issue to be decided by a fractured Court, as it then
was; he did not want a decision to go out with nine or six
or four opinions. He wanted the Court to stand before the
country on this issue united and speaking in a single
voice. He felt that whatever it did had to go out to the
country with an appearance of unity, so that the Court as
an institution would best be able to withstand the attacks
that inevitably were going to be made on it.
[Author's Note: Quotations ofPhilip Elman arefrom With All
Deliberate Speed, which is based on oral history recordings
originallyconductedunder the auspicesof the Columbia Oral
History Research Project in 1983 and 1984.] In 1952, however, a unanimous or nearly unanimous outcome was not
likely. According to Elman, in 1952 Justice Frankfurter could
not count "five sure, or even probable, votes for overruling"
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which had adopted
the principle of "separate but equal."
Justice Jackson shared Frankfurter's view that whatever the
Court did, it should do as a united tribunal. In Elman's
account, what Justice Jackson sought was to "erase Plessy v.
Ferguson,simply erase it. Neither say it's wrong nor say it's
right.... And he wanted, until the very end, for the Court to
be honest and admit that it was rendering a political (as he
called it) decision." But at that time, no justice could find a
position to unite the bench. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
decided to try to postpone a decision for as long as possible.
Elman's account of his conversations with Frankfurter,
published in HarvardLaw Review in 1986, state that the justice helped Elman decide to argue for gradualism in the integration of public elementary schools in the government's
December 1952 brief. That argument permitted the justices to
reach a common agreement about the resolution. A year after the
famous unanimous 1954 decision declaring that separate but
equal had no place in American public education (Brown 1), the
Court decreed in Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), that school
integration would occur under the supervision of the federal
district courts, and "with all deliberate speed." It adopted
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should have a reasonable period of time to work out the details
and timing of implementing the decision. On reading the
brief, Frankfurter called to tell Elman that he had rendered a
"service to the nation." The measure the brief suggested captured the idea of gradualism Frankfurter sought to import
from nonconstitutional contexts.
The phrase "with all deliberate speed" surfaced for the first
time in Solicitor General Jay Lee Rankin's oral argument in
Brown I. Elman helped prepare Rankin for that argument and
was familiar with Justice Frankfurter's use of the words in
several earlier cases, borrowed, Frankfurter said, from Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes. Justice Frankfurter suggested to
Chief Justice Earl Warren that it would be appropriate as a
middle ground between immediate relief and interminable
delay. Frankfurter convinced Warren to include the phrase in
the 1955 relief decree, which ordered implementation to take
place under the jurisdiction of the district courts. The result
took the shape of the proposal that the government suggested
in its 1952 brief.
After it was incorporated into the decree, "with all deliberate speed" became the notorious shorthand for judicial tolerance-some said encouragement-of resistance to integration. On the day the relief decree was issued, the phrase
signaled to Thurgood Marshall and others that the Court's
promise in Brown I had been hollowed out by Brown H. To
them, "with all deliberate speed" meant simply slow. For
more than a decade after Brown II, revanchist school district

gradualism and rejected other possible solutions that might
have accomplished integration swiftly.
The New York Times described Elman's private discussions
with a justice as little short of a betrayal of the ethics of the
legal system. In a March 24, 1987, editorial, the newspaper
opined that Elman had behaved "with all deliberate impropriety." But as it turns out, there is more to the story of ex parte
communication than one conversation between one attorney
and one justice.
Before Brown I, Elman had represented the government
before the Supreme Court in other cases that advocated the
reversal of Plessy. As the assistant solicitor general who handled virtually all of the government's civil rights cases in the
court, Elman encouraged Solicitor General Philip Perlman
and Perlman's superiors to side with the African-American
plaintiffs in such cases as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (outlawing racially restrictive residential covenants);
Henderson v. ICC, 180 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1949), cert denied,
339 U.S. 963 (1950) (invalidating segregated dining car
rules); Sweatt v. Painter,340 U.S. 846 (1950) (ordering the
plaintiff's admission to a white law school based on unequal
black school); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950) (compelling integration of seating in a graduate school).
Perlman, however, drew a line when Elman urged support
for the Brown plaintiffs. "Much to my surprise and dismay,"
Elman told me, "Perlman's response was, 'No, it's much too
early to end segregation in public schools. You can't have little black boys sitting next to little white girls. The country
isn't ready for that. This would lead to miscegenation and
mongrelization of the races."' According to Elman, Perlman's
bigotry left those who hoped the government would intervene
in favor of integration hopelessly stuck. "All the letters to the
attorney general, all the telephone calls, all the visits that were
paid to him didn't make him budge. Perlman said no, 'The
line has to be drawn. Trains, dining cars, law schools, graduate schools, yes-but not public schools, no sir!"'
Then came a corruption scandal in Truman's Justice
Department that radically changed everything. Attorney
General J. Howard McGrath was replaced by James P.
McGranery. Perlman and McGranery did not work well
together, and Perlman departed in August 1952. Elman and
Acting Solicitor General Robert Stern then sought and
received a go-ahead to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs
in Brown.
In December 1952, before the option of gradualism was
placed before the Court, Elman-basing his views to a considerable degree on Frankfurter's accounts-had counted
three sure votes to reverse Plessy (Black, Douglas, Burton),
and three votes to uphold the segregation of public elementary
education (Reed, Clark, Vinson). He counted on Frankfurter
to either concur or reverse, and he was not sure what Jackson
or Minton would do. Elman searched for an argument that
"would get Jackson, that would hold Frankfurter, that would
even get a strong majority to hold racial segregation unconstitutional but would provide some kind of cushion." He wanted
to give the Court "some insurance against the inevitable fallout of a court decision requiring immediate integration everywhere'"
Elman took pride in his draft of the 1952 government brief
in Brown, which suggested that if the Court held racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, the district courts
LITIGATION Fall 2004

"With all deliberate speed"
became shorthand for
judicial tolerance of
resistance to integration.
administrators and local politicians would retard integration
by use of that language.
Nevertheless, Elman took credit for the gradualist proposal. He included it, he said, despite the fact that it was
essentially unprincipled and "indefensible" in denying relief
for a personal constitutional violation. But the phrasing made
it possible to reverse the separate-but-equal doctrine with
more than a bare majority, and without concurrences or dissents. He included it because he believed the Brown cases,
which were essentially test cases, were brought improvidently
and prematurely-"in the wrong places, at the wrong time,
using the wrong arguments."
Separating the constitutional principle of colorblindness
from the remedy of gradualism was a proposal that both principal parties opposed. Yet it carried great weight because it
conveyed endorsement by the Democratic Truman administration and, after the 1952 elections, the Republican Eisenhower administration as well. In Richard Kluger's classic
account Simple Justice (1976), he called the government's
brief "a good deal more useful to the Justices than all ten
briefs filed in the five cases by the litigants."
In participating in the oral history, Elman stressed that
although he and Frankfurter had many private conversations
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about the litigation and the other justices' views about it, Justice Frankfurter did not spoon-feed him the "all deliberate
speed" language. "But it did grow in my mind out of my many
conversations with him over a period of many months." The
suggestion in the government's brief, Elman assures us,
"came as a complete surprise" to Frankfurter. Elman also
emphasized that his proposal for gradualism was not based on
what he thought was right. Rather, Elman was "counting
votes" and seeking a realistic formula to win the case and
"knock out separate but equal" without damaging the Court or
the public educational systems. And without presenting the
gradualist alternative to the Court as Elman did, the outcome
in Brown might well have been profoundly unhappy from
many different perspectives.
Even with the gradualist formula in front of them, however, the justices did not reach any conclusion about their
collective position at their first conference early in 1953,
after the oral argument. The arguments include some illuminating exchanges between the justices and John W. Davis,
Thurgood Marshall, and Robert Carter. But there were also
some especially low points. Elman described how Milton
Korman, representing the District of Columbia, raised a
phantom from the past:
The courtroom was filled. John W. Davis was on the
same side, and Korman said something like this: "I
would like to read to the Court some eloquent words
written by a Chief Justice of this Court many years ago,
as relevant to this case as they were to the case in which
he wrote." And I listened and tried to figure out what it
was he was reading from. What case was this? After
about thirty seconds, I got it and couldn't believe, I just
couldn't believe it. He was reading to the Court from
Dred Scott v. Sandford... By God, when he finished
reading, he said, "Your Honors, those are the words of
Chief Justice Roger Taney in the case of Dred Scott v.
Sandford." It was incredible! Imagine, the Dred Scott
case, the one case everyone agrees was the worst decision in the history of the Supreme Court, and he read that
to them in arguing the D.C. case.
The specter of DredScott hung over the Court-as if it needed
reminders about just how dangerous its opinion might be.
When the justices discussed the cases after the first arguments ended, they did not take a vote. Their subsequently
published notes suggest that a decision at that time would
have involved dissents, and probably, concurrences. Vinson,
Reed, and Clark seem to have been unpersuaded as to the need
to reverse Plessy. Jackson and Frankfurter had trouble reconciling their personal views with their jurisprudential conservatism and the political and social magnitude of a reversal.
Douglas, Black, and Minton appeared ready to reverse without further discussion; Burton wanted "plenty of time" in any
decree. As a group, as Elman put it, "They couldn't decide the
cases, they didn't know what to do with them, they had no
majority, and they hadn't even taken a formal vote, because
they didn't want to harden anybody's position." So they set
the cases down for reargument, including new briefs and new
oral arguments, which took place after the 1952 presidential
elections.
The major intended effect of the delay was to box the
Eisenhower administration into taking a position in support of
school desegregation. As Elman said, "When the Court
announced its decision, [Frankfurter] wanted both the present
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and former presidents of the United States to be publicly on
record as having urged the Court to take the position it had.
And that's exactly the way it worked out."
The remainder of the story may sound familiar, particularly
in this 50th anniversary year. When Fred Vinson unexpectedly
died late in September 1953, Frankfurter considered the death
enormously beneficial to the cause of ending school segregation. "As long as Vinson was Chief Justice, they could never
get unanimity or anything close to it," Elman told me.
On October 5, 1954, Earl Warren took his seat as chief
justice. He proved extraordinarily gifted and courageous in
many respects. He was especially talented in negotiating
with his colleagues-reflected in his engineering of the twopart Brown decision that divorced the finding of a constitutional violation from its remedy. Having been present but
largely silent at the reargument of the case, he told his colleagues soon afterward that delays no longer were appropriate and that he personally had concluded that segregation of
Negro schoolchildren had to be ended, "with a minimum of
emotion and strife."
As Elman 'iewed it, Warren's job had been made easier
than generally has been understood. By the time Warren
assumed his office, Vinson was dead, disagreement over principle had narrowed considerably, and the proposal of gradualism achieved through district court supervision and enforcement offered the possibility of accomplishing desegregation
with less "emotion and strife."
The Court announced its opinion in Brown I on May 17,
1954, concluding that "in the field of public education, the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown I was unanimous, and its declaration ending segregation in public schools
rang in clarion tones. What remained in this unusual case was
a decree to grant relief.
Around the time that the Court set the case down for further
argument on that issue, Frankfurter wrote a mutually congratulatory note to Elman that together, they had managed to succeed in their efforts to "keep political considerations out of the
Court's deliberations." But, he remarked, keeping politics out
of the remaining litigation would be especially difficult.
Although the public arguments among the parties suggested
that this might be true, the justices themselves had less difficulty in reaching a conclusion than Frankfurter had feared.
The briefs and oral arguments on the issue of relief in 1954
exposed the deep divisions between the parties. Each side
staked out opposite positions on many issues, including the
amount of time to allow for compliance with the decision ending segregation. The surviving conference notes, memoranda,
and reflections of the justices, however, show that when they
met in April 1955 to discuss a relief order, there was considerable agreement about what the decree should look like.
They tended to agree with Justice Minton that the main goal
should be, as Kluger reported, "to get the desegregation
process started without, in the process, revealing its own
impotence to make it happen." Justice Black impressed on the
other justices that it would be especially difficult to desegregate rapidly in the South. The idea of a time limit, in particular, was not generally appealing. Finding their way toward a
unanimous relief decree was considered of great importance.
Elman's discussions with Justice Frankfurter led to the
approach that made unanimity possible.
What should we make of all this? Did the conversations
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of their color, that in everything it did, government had
to be color-blind.
He said that he would not defend his discussions with Frankfurter in technical terms. "I just did what I thought was right,"
he said. He had acted reflexively:
I regarded myself, in the literal sense, as an amicus
curiae. The personal relationship that existed between
Justice Frankfurter and me was very close. I was his law
clerk emeritus, and he regarded me as his law clerk no
matter where I was and what I did. That continued to be
the case until the day he died.
Usually there were unspoken restrictions on their conversations. They never substantively discussed a case that Elman
had argued before the Court. But, Elman reminded me:
Brown v. Board of Education, which we fully discussed,
was an extraordinary case, and the ordinary rules didn't
apply. In that case I knew everything, or at least he gave
me the impression that I knew everything, that was going
on at the Court. He told me about what was said in conference and who said it.
Criticism erupted when portions of the Elman interviews
were published in the HarvardLaw Review. Some scholars
and popular commentators claimed that, even if Elman's conversations were the only ones that took place and even if they
were ethically improper, they were defensible from a larger
moral perspective in light of their success in overturning
racial apartheid. On March 26, 1987, Max Lerner editorialized in the New York Post: "Elman's answer rings true: Without that little impropriety you would not have had this enor-

between Frankfurter and Elman constitute "improper machinations," as some suggested? Were they unusual, whether or
not they were improper? Do they support the criticism that
Brown might have been an unprincipled decision or an illegitimate overreach of judicial authority, or both? Would their
discussions be improper today, or are we unrealistically naive
about the way the most important of Court decisions often are
made? It should be noted that the list of Supreme Court decisions criticized for possible improprieties and improper conflicts of interest includes several of the most important decisions the Court ever has decided-not just Dred Scott and
Brown but also Marbury v. Madison and Bush v. Gore.
In evaluating these questions, we may begin with Elman's
own defense of his behavior. When I asked him whether,
through their private discussions, Justice Frankfurter had been
receiving a government "brief' from him all along-one to
which John Davis and others never had a chance to replyElman appealed to the larger cause in which he had been
enlisted:
I have no easy, snappy response to that view. In Brown I
didn't consider myself a lawyer for a litigant. I considered it a cause that transcended ordinary notions about
propriety in a litigation. This was not a litigation in the
usual sense. The constitutional issue went to the heart of
what kind of country we are, what kind of Constitution
and Supreme Court we have: whether, almost a century
after the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the Court
could find the wisdom and courage to hold that the
amendment meant what it said, that black people could
no longer be singled out and treated differently because

LITIGATION

Fall 2004

to

Volume 31 Number I

mous contribution to American constitutional life of the 20th
Century." The Los Angeles Times similarly opined on March
29, 1987: "It may not have been right for Frankfurter to tell
Elman what was going on inside the Court, but it's a lucky
thing that he did." Others did not and would not agree. The
New York Times, for example, wrote on March 24, 1987: "The
secret, one-sided relationship, once divulged, cries out for
contemporary judgment: It was wrong."
Elman elaborated further in his own defense in an April 1,
1987, letter to the New York Times. He stated that the criticized
conversations occurred when neither he nor Frankfurter
believed that the civil rights attorneys in the Solicitor General's Office would be permitted by Perlman and his superiors
to file a brief on behalf of the government.
Should Justice Frankfurter and I have had the prescience
to foresee the unlikely series of events, described in the
oral history, that culminated in Mr. McGranery's reversal of the Perlman-McGrath decision? Looking back
now in the perspective of an Edwin Meese 3d as Attorney General, perhaps I should have recused myself from
working on the amicus brief. I must plead guilty: It never
occurred to me.
Nonetheless, editorials and reports continued to criticize
Elman's private conversations with Justice Frankfurter.
Andrew Kaufman, a Harvard professor and former Frankfurter clerk, faulted his judge for having "engaged in ex
parte conversations with a lawyer for the United States,
which was involved as amicus in the most important case of
the century." See "Constitutional Law and the Supreme
Court: Frankfurter and Wellington," N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 45
(2001):143. The idea that Elman's status as his "law clerk
for life" might trump Elman's actual role as a government
lawyer was, Kaufman argued, an "entirely specious notion."
Kaufman further noted that, considering the civil rights litigation in which the government already had been involved,
Elman's clarifications did not wholly refute assertions of
mutual impropriety. "Even if they occurred when it seemed
unlikely that the United States would participate," Kaufman
wrote, "that does not change the fact that the United States
Government had been involved in previous litigation raising
the issues of Brown and had an enormous interest in the outcome of the pending litigation."
More recently, Derrick Bell's book Silent Covenants
(2004) suggests that in light of the subsequent failures of
school desegregation litigation, an opinion that actually
affirmed Plessy but insisted on equalization of every aspect of
educational and social institutions would have been preferable to the actual outcome in Brown. From that perspective
(with which this author does not agree) those conversations
would be deemed not constructive of racial justice but
destructive of racial equality.
Neither the original oral history transcript nor the Harvard
Law Review excerpts clearly conveys that Elman and Frankfurter entirely stopped talking about the Brown cases as soon
as the government became involved. Indeed, Elman's stated
view that he considered Brown "a cause that transcended ordinary notions about propriety in a litigation" suggests that they
did not.
In the view of some prominent scholars, it would have
transgressed ethical rules for Elman, as a lawyer, to communicate with Frankfurter about Brown at any time during the
pendency of the litigation, regardless whether he represented
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a party. "The proscription of ex parte communications goes
back at least to the ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional
Ethics," Professor Monroe Freedman wrote to me in a private
communication in 2003. "Canon 3 says in part: 'A lawyer
should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as
to the merits of a pending case.' Note the disjunctive." Judges
were guided by related proscriptions:
... He [the judge) should not permit private interviews,
arguments or communications designed to influence his
judicial action, where interests to be affected thereby are
not represented before him, except in cases where provision is made by law for exparte application ... he should
not permit the contents of ... briefs presented to him to

be concealed from opposing counsel. Ordinarily all communications of counsel to the judge intended or calculated to influence action should be made known to
opposing counsel.
Canons of Professional Ethics, Canons of Judicial Ethics,
Canons 33 and 17 (1936 ed.) 2, 33.
Elman argued implicitly that Canon 3 as it was then understood was meant to prohibit lawyers from arguing their own
pending cases with judges, that lawyers were just as free as
others to converse with judges about matters in which they
were not involved, and that he had talked to Frankfurter about
Brown only while the government was not an intervenor.
Elman also suggested that his role in the Solicitor General's
Office granted him special latitude to communicate with the
court in circumstances where that communication was
invited.
I have not yet found a discussion by Justice Frankfurter of
his habits in communicating with Elman or other friends

about pending or nonpending cases. I have, however, examined the private correspondence between the two men that
each saved. Frankfurter was a wonderful letter writer, in the
epistolary tradition of late 19th and early 20th century correspondents. Elman, too, was a splendid writer who corresponded comfortably. The two men did have a close relationship, and it seems clear that their common interest in legal
affairs and current events, rather than the Canons, generally
was uppermost in their thoughts as they talked and wrote to
each other.
It adds a dimension of complexity to realize that Elman's
discussions with Justice Frankfurter, when they did take
place, probably occurred in the context of private conversations Frankfurter had with friends on every side of the civil
rights struggle. Elman suspected or knew that Frankfurter
was conversing with others on the subject of overruling
Plessy.
Frankfurter maintained friendships with Southerners who
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defended Plessy, as well as with at least one clerk working
with the NAACP. In Simple Justice, Richard Kluger's rich history of the Brown decision, he implies that at least two others
who were close to Frankfurter-James Byrnes, the former
justice and governor of South Carolina who actively participated in the defense strategy, and William Coleman, a former
Frankfurter clerk who provided services for the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund-also talked with him about the case.
Kluger does not specify the timing.
In contrast, at least some of the justices appear to have
avoided any outside discussions of the case. Justice Minton's
biographers state that Minton would not discuss the case with
anyone else. "Regarding all the Court's business, but especially pertaining to Brown, Minton was adamant that neither
he nor his law clerks would discuss the deliberations of the
Court with outsiders, either then or in the future." Linda C.
Gugin and James E. St. Clair, Sherman Minton: New Deal
Senator, Cold War Justice 263-64 (1997).
Unwillingness to hear from other litigants outside normal
court channels was not uniform across the Court, however. In
an authoritative biography of Governor Jimmy Byrnes, David
Robertson makes clear that Byrnes did not feel shy about
communicating with several other friends and former colleagues on the Court about Brown while the case was being
decided. "[I]n the spring and summer of 1953, before the
rehearing," Robertson wrote, "Byrnes made the rounds of his
former place of employment at the Court... he lobbied two

The justices were
concerned that their
conference deliberations
would not remain private.
old friends there, Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Associate
Justice Felix Frankfurter." Sly and Able: A PoliticalBiography of James F Byrnes 517 (1994).
Justice Jackson's secretary, Elsie L. Douglas, in an April
28, 1954, letter to C. George Niebank, a former Jackson law
clerk, reported that Byrnes also had a "confab" with Justice
Jackson in his hospital room in April 1954, the same period
during which Chief Justice Warren was circulating drafts of
the Brown opinion to Jackson. Jackson Papers, Box 17,
Library of Congress. Chief Justice Warren's memoirs reflect
that President Eisenhower tried to encourage ex parte communication when, at a White House dinner, he seated Warren
near himself and John W. Davis, who was representing the
Brown defendants. Warren recollected that Eisenhower "went
to considerable lengths to tell me what a great man Mr. Davis
was." At the end of the meal and "speaking of the Southern
states in the segregation cases," Eisenhower said, "These are
not bad people. All they are concerned about is to see that
their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big overgrown Negroes." Earl Warren, The Memoirs of EarlWarren 291 (1977).
The justices, furthermore, apparently were concerned that
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their conference deliberations about the case would not
remain private. In a memorandum for the file dated May 17,
1954, Justice Douglas recorded that "in December 1952 it
was decided that there should be no recorded vote in the
cases because of the likelihood that there might be some
leaks." The Supreme Court in Conference 660 (Del Dickson, ed., 2001).
Ex parte communication in the Brown cases was not limited
to the level of the Supreme Court. Professor Jack Greenberg
relates that in lower court proceedings in Briggs v. Elliott, the
exposure of "backdoor dealings" between members of the
NAACP board and Judge J. Waties Waring worried Thurgood
Marshall considerably. Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the
Courts 122 (1994).
Multiple private conversations would not diminish the
extent of impropriety by any of the parties, according to
ethics scholar Monroe Freedman. "Even if Frankfurter was
listening to lawyers on all sides (not likely)," Freedman
pointed out, it would be theoretically possible but most
unlikely for multiple violations to have canceled one another
out. Frankfurter was not providing each lawyer with "the
substance of each of the other communications and giving
the lawyers a chance to respond." In a multi-judge court, the
other justices should have been made aware of what was
going on. Finally, "[I]t doesn't matter whether the lawyer is
representing a party, currently or imminently. The judge
shouldn't be getting extrajudicial communications without
making the parties aware of them."
Professor Freedman's view that whether a lawyer is representing a pending party shouldn't affect the prohibition is
reinforced by ethical rules adopted since Brown. In 1990, in
response to several publicized instances of ex parte communication between courts and experts and scholars, the Judicial
Conference added section l(b) to Canon 3, which permits
judges to "obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the
law applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge
gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond." Notwithstanding this enactment, several
conclusions are likely: Some private conversations with
judges still take place outside the Canon's newer notification
rules; some judges continue informally to invite the opinions
of former law clerks, scholars, and other non-party attorneys
about pending cases; and prohibiting all such contact is not
universally supported.
Notwithstanding the rules of legal ethics, several
respected justices and several honored litigants communicated ex parte in Brown. The fact that multiple litigants had
multiple discussions with multiple justices should sharply
refocus attention to examining the difference between the
Court's formal rules of ethics and procedure on one hand
and its actual behavior on the other.
If Brown was the exception, its treatment was unusual
because it presented such extraordinary perils-so politically
delicate, socially sensitive, difficult to discuss squarely in a
public forum, and potentially destructive of judicial authority-that some of the justices set their formal rules aside to
receive perspectives about the case that might not have been
available in a hearing. And yet the uncomfortable truth
remains: However useful these multiple back channels were,
they were also arguably unnecessary, definitely irregular, possibly unfair, and unlawful by the Court's own rules. I
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